


PHILOSOPHY,
RELIGION AND
EDUCATION

CHRISTIANITY and CRISIS



A Christian Journal of Opinion

"Brinkmanship" in the Middle East

The present Middle Eastern crisis raises again three issues that have troubled American policy-makers over the past four decades. Concretely, they are the problems of: deterring overt aggression, of meeting indirect aggression and of diplomatic accommodation. American experience and imagination, brought to bear on the first of these problems, has been largely successful; our failures in concept and policy cluster around the other two.

Most Americans learned from events leading up to World War II that potential aggressors, left in doubt by the rest of international society as to its intention to resist, embarked on bold military expansionism that ultimately was checked only in total war. It was agreed that nations in declarations and deeds had to be ready to halt aggression before it spread. Korea, in a double sense, was the test of this doctrine, for the failure initially to make our intentions clear may have led the Communists to miscalculate and invade South Korea, even as subsequent resoluteness by the United Nations and the United States helped to discourage them from reckless adventures elsewhere in Asia. Vishinsky complained bitterly after Korea that the United States could not be depended upon.

Mr. Dulles' warning to the Russians over Turkey must be seen as a reasonable effort to anticipate another such miscalculation. All the exaggerated talk for and against Mr. Dulles and "brinkmanship" ought not to obscure the historical grounds for such action even though it is fair to ask whether the present Administration has pursued the best programs for assuring that our capacity for military action kept pace with our declarations.

The validity of recent steps to meet the other recurrent problems are more questionable in nature. Indirect aggression has been with us since the

Bolshevik Revolution, but responses now as then are uncertain, hesitant and often confused. Policy-makers seem alternately to assume that the threats of internal disruption and subversion will be conquered as a kind of extra dividend of military security guarantees, or that generous infusions of economic aid will wipe out the problem.

The Middle Eastern crisis and the failures of Western policy throw into question the adequacy of either assumption. For much of the region the security problem is linked with economic problems which in turn rest on political foundations. Only an approach that is interlocking in character can cope with this issue.

For example, the refugee problem has never been insoluble in purely economic terms. Both sides have preferred to keep it alive and before the world for political purposes. Israel has insisted that the admission of large numbers of Arab refugees would constitute a "Trojan horse" and a threat to internal security. At the same time, however, numbers of Arabs already admitted have increasingly been integrated into Israel's national life. Arabs have talked less about possible opportunities for refugees in Iraq, Libya and in the Jordan Valley than about Jewish intransigence. It is at least conceivable that an arrangement is now possible whereby Israel might announce its willingness to accept Arab refugees in return for security guarantees from within and outside the region. Similarly the Middle Eastern countries with problems of economic development and unstable regimes may in time be prepared to accept, tacitly at least, the existence of the rugged little state of Israel.

The linking of economic development and the relaxation of Arab-Israel tension was implicit in Mr. Dulles' proposal of August 1955, in which he pledged American economic assistance for develop-

ment and the resettlement of refugees if the parties settled their dispute over territorial boundaries. Possibly the time has come when these views should be restated, but through active intervention at appropriate diplomatic levels.

Short of this, the festering sore of Arab-Israeli conflict promises to poison every attempt to meet internal subversion, no matter how generous the economic largess. Left to themselves neither the Arabs nor the Jews seem likely to take the first step, but with prompting and subtle pressures both may indeed welcome a way out from certain of their present dilemmas. If a first step, inspired by the United States, were the announcement of Israeli willingness to accept refugees, the way might be unlocked for a series of regional economic developments, like the Jordan Valley Development, which thus far have remained in suspense pending progress on political problems.

The third issue arising is that of political accommodation—not only among the states within the area, but also between Moscow and Washington.

How are the great powers to look upon this theater in the "cold war"? Is it one where the temperature must forever remain near the boiling point, where armaments must be supplied in increasing amounts by both sides and where the natural state must continue to be unremitting civil war? Or is there a prospect, however remote, of political settlement founded on self-enforcing agreements? Would both sides, in an age tormented by the inescapable peril of thermonuclear conflict, have an interest in putting calipers on the struggle, drawing a ring around the area and recognizing the special status of the Middle East in the "cold war"?

It is easier to raise than to answer these questions.

KENNETH W. THOMPSON

LIMITED WARFARE

NO BOOK in recent years promises to be so influential in recasting traditional thinking about war and peace in a nuclear age as the volume *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy* by Henry Kissinger. The book grew out of a study group, called together by the Council on Foreign Relations, which Kissinger directed.

Kissinger believes that the strategy of the Western powers has been unduly directed to the development of ultimate weapons, based on the feeling that such weapons will deter any enemy from starting a war, and to a strategy of defense or detection

which would prevent a surprise attack. The universal presupposition is that we would not unleash an atomic war and that we must in every event prevent a surprise attack which would create such havoc as to make adequate retaliation impossible. In that negative sense we are still thinking of winning a war, if it breaks out, but we are thinking chiefly of how we can prevent the "all-out" war from breaking out.

Kissinger marshals all the evidence to prove that a war with ultimate weapons is indeed suicidal, or at least will cause terrible immediate havoc and untold genetic deterioration. That an ultimate war is impossible is not disputed; but Kissinger challenges many of the conclusions which have been drawn from this conviction. He does not believe that the strategies of deterrence (which are based upon our superiority in atomic weapons) still hold when there is a clear stalemate in the atomic race, with a possible Russian superiority. He does not think that even Russian superiority would inevitably tempt the Russians to start the war.

Kissinger did not anticipate sputnik, but he did speculate upon the possibility of both sides having the inter-continental ballistic missile (ICBM) by about 1960. Clearly the Russian moon is no more than a harmless way of announcing to the world that Russia has indeed developed the ICBM: otherwise it would not have had the power to send the rocket into outer space.

The ICBM, Kissinger points out, invalidates much of our strategic planning, including the advance bases which we maintain all over the world in order to redress the Russian advantage in her possession of the great Eurasian land mass. It also makes our detection system useless, for the missiles could be launched without being detected. Furthermore it makes dubious the inspection system which we have insisted on as a presupposition of disarmament.

Kissinger believes, rightly I think, that disarmament proposals will be as vain in the future as they have been in the past. The unvarying Russian price of disarmament is that we both pull out of Europe thereby exposing Europe to the tender mercies of the nearer Russian power. He observes rightly again, that much of the disarmament hope rests upon the illusions of legalistic idealism, which imagines that the United Nations is some kind of super-government that can enforce its delusions on the nations.

The present danger is that our military planning and our political strategy have made us incapable either of conceiving limited wars or of winning them. We lack the latter capacity because budget considerations and interservice rivalries have tempted us to put all our strategic eggs in the basket of deterrence from the ultimate war and to put none in the basket of strategic power for countering Russian offensive in limited wars.

The "all or nothing" psychology of modern politics, he observes, is a fairly recent development, beginning with the World War I and was typically expressed in the "unconditional surrender" objective of the World War II. Nations are willing to accept defeat, if their very survival is not threatened. They must accept it if the only alternative is to grasp after the ultimate weapon which will be equally costly to both sides. We must be ready to fight limited wars in terms of our objectives and to win them with the appropriate weapons.

This circumspect and wise analysis of possibilities and probabilities makes more sense than anything which has come to our notice in recent times.

R. N.

PRINCETON AND THE PRIEST

WE ARE told that it is not news when a dog bites a man, but we all know it *is* news when a man bites a dog. Likewise, historically speaking, the occasions are not entirely rare when the church has seen fit to excommunicate scholars, or when it has been accused by the academic community of authoritarian censorship and thought control. However, the converse *is* news.

And if we would believe Father Hugh Halton, chaplain to Catholic students and director of the Aquinas Foundation at Princeton, that is exactly what happened. Having recently been denied, by action of the board of trustees, use of university meeting rooms, publication of notices of meetings in the university bulletin and participation in all the university activities, Fr. Halton insists this is "excommunication" and "an example of true 'authoritarian censorship' and an unrefined attempt to impose 'thought control.'" He thus questions whether Princeton can retain "its claim to the liberal tradition while attempting to suppress intelligent criticism."

It is not at all clear, however, that Fr. Halton has defined the issues properly. We have followed his activities for several years, and we wonder if his concern "to expose false teaching and intolerable academic incompetence" has not taken the form of something resembling witch hunting.

Times have changed, however, and Fr. Halton isn't getting too much support for his crusade against those professors at Princeton who "are doing more harm than all the writings of Karl Marx put together." Even so George E. Sokolsky, syndicated Hearst columnist and ardent supporter of the late Senator McCarthy, rushed to Fr. Halton's defense with what we believe to be a new line for Mr. Sokolsky: "Difference of opinion is the spice of the intellectual life."

And so it is. Which is why we were astounded when we heard that Fr. Halton refused Jacques Maritain, noted Catholic scholar and winner of the Cardinal Spellman-Aquinas medal of the American Catholic Philosophical Association, the right to speak at the Aquinas Foundation in Princeton because "Dr. Maritain does not have a very sound philosophical background." There was also the occasion when he vigorously sought to dissuade the university from allowing a student group to bring Alger Hiss to the campus for a speech. When the university refused to intervene, Fr. Halton called it Princeton's "darkest hour."

Nor has the priest at Princeton gone about his business quietly. He has used every means at his disposal to circulate his charges of "atheism" and "subversion." From the pulpit, through newspaper advertisements and through a nationwide speaking tour, he has continued to criticize the faculty and administration of the university.

Finally, after the failure of attempts to find a "satisfactory" solution left no other alternative, the university acted. After noting that Fr. Halton's accusations had broadened into large unsubstantiated charges of malfeasance against the administration of the university and other respected organizations, Dr. Robert F. Goheen, president of the university, announced: "For tactics of this sort no university devoted to freedom of rational inquiry and debate need make a home."

It is a grievous situation when members of any religious community lack the helpful guidance of a wise chaplain, one who can present the views of his community with clarity and charity, who can cooperate and converse with those who hold views contrary to his own. The action of the university in withdrawing privileges from the chaplain has not changed the situation essentially. It has only called attention once more to an already grievous situation. It is up to Bishop George W. Ahr, Fr. Halton's superior, to provide the Catholic community of Princeton University with the guidance they need.

W. H. C.

Is There A New Russia Since Stalin?

M. SEARLE BATES

WELL ALONG in the fifth year since Stalin died, we are still perplexed as to the major trends in Russia, prime disturber of peace and complacency in the rest of the world. Relaxation from the taut ex remes of Stalin's twenty-five year reign we know to be a fact. But how much relaxation, for how long and what is its true nature?

Some experts tell us that Russian progress in education, technology and industry has perforce brought into being a more enlightened society, which has outgrown the crude compulsions of Stalin's time and is well on the way to a milder regime, more satisfactory to the people of Russia and to other nations near and far. Others insist that the relaxation is essentially a technical improvement or adjustment, correcting faults that hampered the Communist system in its determined course toward drastic control of the world, and that the management, strengthened rather than radically transformed, proceeds with more astute flexibility and increasing power to develop and to marshal immense resources for the intimidation and manipulation of mankind.

An indicative part of the response to our questions is that a clear and dependable answer, no matter how complex or qualified, remains impossible. For the locus of decision-making in Russia, the personal lives and actual minds of the leading men, the true workings of an enormous industry and agriculture, the size and character of the armed forces, the quantity of economic resources devoted to them, the degree to which intelligent administrators and technicians *think* about great national and international issues, the long-term effect of ideological conditioning and massive controls, even the basic facts of population, are not open to direct knowing.

A great number of persons in many countries are engaged in gathering, analyzing and interpreting meager and often deliberately misleading scraps of Russian "information" about the most ordinary matters which open countries report to the United Nations and publish freely, subject to private and hostile check and study of every sort. Guessing the character of one of the world's polar powers is now a science something like parapsychology, which tries to investigate the life of those who are no longer visible to us upon earth, but who speak most strangely in darkened rooms where men and mat-

erial objects are reported to move outside the familiar rules of Newton. Yet the very survival of the mankind known to us may depend upon comprehending the Russians and what their chiefs really intend to do with their power. Among a hundred venturesome essays, this one will be restrained and brief.

Khrushchev—Heir to Stalin

Peering into the smog, we must strive to see how things are going in this five-year period (1953-57) which Stalin, at least, did not plan just this way. "De-Stalinization" is the concept usually employed in such discussions. But we must remind ourselves at the outset that a controlled rhythm of tense compression and of directed relaxation has long been the totalitarian technique of the Communist system, chiefly developed by Stalin himself. Moreover, the old maestro, demented yet still magnificent as he was finally declared to be by his partners and beneficiaries, prepared in his final years some of the zigs and zags for which they later took credit.

It was Stalin who said in 1952 that it might be possible to overthrow the capitalist states without making direct war upon them, who determined to wipe out the last remainders of private interest in agriculture, who advocated modest concessions to consumers while maintaining the absolute primacy of heavy investment in heavy industry as the ground of military and total power. And the men who inaugurated "de-Stalinization" were Stalin's men. During most of these five years the Presidium of eleven was constituted by nine whom Stalin had appointed, plus two of Khrushchev's secretaries. True, the changes during the five years have disposed of Beria, Malenkov, Molotov, among the old-timers, and have increased Khrushchev's own creatures.

But Khrushchev is indeed the true bearer of Stalin's Stalinism. It was he who led the great drive for collectivization in the Ukraine from 1928 and the immense liquidations required to accomplish it, who took a strong role in the classic purges of the late 'thirties in Moscow, who played a vigorous part in the executive violence of the war, who was the driving reorganizer of agriculture in the postwar years, who had long been a great engineer of the party dynamo as the right hand of Stalin.

"De-Stalinization" purported to free the Party from the evils dramatized in Stalin—the evils of personal dictatorship which no one dared to call

Dr. Bates is a member of the editorial board and teaches at Union Seminary in New York.

by the name because of the taboo protecting the word sacred to the proletariat and its vanguard—and from the terror which had destroyed so many within its ranks and overpowered the judgment and courage of those who survived at close hand, including the immediate heirs. Emphasis on "collective leadership" was at the same time a covered wagon for transfer of power while the succession was undetermined. It was a slogan that was useful for the revival of confidence in the Party and its top leadership.

Does the system relentlessly require one person as dictator, as some students conclude? Or is the glorification of the leader "foreign to the spirit of Marx-Leninism"? If the latter, the whole political methodology centered around the words and the portraits of Lenin, Khrushchev, Mao, Tito and the other stars of the Communist constellation is off the beam.

Incidentally, it is hard to name any human being who speaks *ex cathedra* to experts on a wider range of subjects than does Khrushchev. The famous 20th Congress, at which he professed to demolish Stalin for a million crimes summed up in the ritual charge "the cult of the individual," heard Khrushchev give the following: the opening address; the report of the Secretary of the Party, covering every phase of political and national life; the report of the chairman of the committee to prepare a resolution on the report; secret report on Stalin; and the closing address.

Happily, Bulganin was permitted to read the report on the sixth five-year plan, consisting of notes and paraphrases upon Khrushchev's major report. What did Khrushchev mean when he declared to the Congress, "Our Party is now more monolithic than ever. . . .?"

De-Stalinization—An Illusion

The problem of terror cannot be examined here. But the specifications against Stalin and the political tears of Khrushchev and the Congress were all directed to the slaughter of Party comrades. For the millions of others slain by orders of Stalin, Khrushchev and company pronounced not one word of formal regret. Indeed, those orders were fundamentals of the record of achievement on which they stood together: the building of the monolithic Leninist party and the destruction of the semi-free peasantry.

But de-Stalinization, artificial as we have seen it to be, was no integral, consistent policy. It seems possible to discern four stages and two major back-

swings in the scant five years since Stalin's death in 1953:

(1) This stage lasted until the fall of Beria and included four months of internal adjustments to lessen the risks of opposition and perhaps intended as lasting correctives—a period of amnesties, subordination of the state security organs, restoration of "socialist legality" in normalizing procedures, less insistence upon Russification among minorities, "collective leadership." (2) From mid-1953 to early 1955 ending with the resignation of Malenkov—characterized by an advertised advance of consumer interests at the cost of the usual high rate of investment in heavy industry, a shift which was checked late in 1954 and officially renounced just before Malenkov departed. (3) Early 1955 to early 1956, culminating in the 20th Congress of the Party—characterized by decentralization of economic administration, intended to broaden the possibilities of initiative and to gain in total efficiency. (4) The remainder of 1956—notable for open critique, from the top, of Stalin and some aspects of his policies or methods, including token revision of his deformed *Short History of the Communist Party* and rehabilitation of a favored few among those "enemies of the people" whose lives and characters had been destroyed by earlier condemnations.

Khrushchev and his troupe, with their eyes upon China, Yugoslavia and Poland, reached out for socialist cooperation elsewhere and accepted the idea of independent ways to socialism, which might even be accomplished by parliamentary triumph. They also denounced, for the moment, Stalin's unpleasant theory about the sharpening of the class struggle *after* a victorious revolution, a theory which had been useful in the destruction of non-Communists throughout the Communist world. Also, more generous or better-calculated social policy dropped the penalty of six months' corrective labor for twenty minutes' tardiness in reporting for work; abolished fees for secondary and higher education; cut the urban work week by two hours and promised eventual return to the seven-hour day of the late 'thirties; increased the pitifully small pensions for the aged; and even introduced into certain factories an advisory council of workers (in the dictatorship of the proletariat!).

But the point of apparent danger had been reached, or a shift in the will of the leadership occurred as they watched and directed the pendulum swinging back and forth from intensified compulsion to purposeful relaxation, from the stick to the carrot. Who can know in Russia? There

were some signs that social initiative was appearing in other elements than the top dignitaries. So controls began to tighten with orders to restrain criticism of Stalin and his policies. Khrushchev and other spokesmen praised Stalin's meritorious services. Was this "re-Stalinization," or sensitive anticipation of impending trouble, or merely the prudence of masters who were determined to rule while permitting their workers more oxygen than the old ration did?

A New Effectiveness

Some observers find three currents of faction and of policy contending variously during this period, with Khrushchev and the third current tending to gain while blending in some ingredients from the first two: (1) those who wanted as little change as possible (the Stalin system without Stalin); (2) reformers who sought economic efficiency and national well-being, with less political management of economic life and greater personal security; (3) those who wanted reform of the Party under the slogan of Leninism, aiming at political effectiveness in the management of Russia's entire resources, material and human.

The Hungarian affair in late 1956 was accompanied by increased pressure upon the Russian public mind, especially upon youth. The newspapers have multiplied their ideological harangues, stereotyping the "nihilists" who condemned Stalin indiscriminately, and the "demagogues" who "irresponsibly" asked for what the Party would not consider (i.e., a slight beginning of competition for elective posts). This and other ideas of improving the political machinery were attributed to poisonous bourgeois propaganda instigated by ruling circles in America for the express purpose of weakening the socialist fatherland.

The official line now restored Stalin's thesis on sharpening the class struggle in Communist-controlled societies. It attacked Yugoslavia and rigorously hedged the acknowledgment of independent ways to socialism by insisting upon the priority, pre-eminence and power of the great Russian example. It is too early to see just how the very recent improvement in understanding with Tito is being explained among the Russian people. But there seems to be a general agreement, in which Mao, Tito and Gomulka provide good quotes for *Pravda*, that Hungary shows what happens if national or reformist ideas are allowed headway. Communist regimes, beginning with Russia, have all taken careful note and will henceforth act with caution.

All in all, Khrushchev and his associates seem to have put aside Stalin's murderous terrorism with-

in the Party (they have announced only thirty political executions) thus enabling faithful and conforming members to proceed in relative security. The manners of diplomacy are said to be improved, though the Turks and Adenauer have reason to judge differently.

Khrushchev is omnipresent as well as omniscient, but the abundance of his words precludes deification. The leader and his men have shown some flexibility or carelessness on such extreme points of theory as the urgent imminence of doom for the non-Communist world and the absolute inevitability of world wars. But the main outlook set before their people, and apparently coming forth from their own thinking, is still along the same lines of Lenin and Stalin.

The monolithic party dictatorship continues. Only those concessions have been made to satellites which the Russians believed should keep the total power of Communism at its best; and Hungary is there for all to see. The division of Germany is asserted more rigidly than ever. Agriculture is being carried into the last stages of "unification" in the system of state property. The other-destroying, expansive ideology is unchanged in essence. Guarded contacts with the outer world have modestly increased, and they look large against the old curtain of total closure.

But sympathetic and competent visitors to Russia are appalled at the ignorance and dangerous misrepresentation of the free world which kindly Russians exhibit. The editors of the standard professional journal, *Problems of History*, have just been slapped down for a brief and restrained appeal on behalf of objectivity—accursed by the Communist ideologists as a bourgeois trap.

And of the Future?

To date the thaw has not proceeded far, and a freezing night may be close at hand. Indeed, are we sure that the thaw is a harbinger of spring, or could it be just a warmish day on the brink of a Russian winter? There are careful scholars of totalitarianism who believe that the inner force and logic of that system drive it toward ever increasing concentration. Others think that protest, discussion, concession, education are an "irreversible" (a foreign word in the heaven of the dialectic) tide which will carry Russia to a better society. Are they comparable to a tide, or are they in Russia the waters of carefully regulated canals, designed and operated by political engineers, subject to variation and to testing, but always under real control for the purposes of the administrators?

(Continued on Page 152)



Saint Hereticus

**Secrets for Seminarians,
or
Confounding the Orthodox
Within Their Own Bailiwick**

Get 'em young, I say, and you can keep 'em for life (and death). Give me a child for 27 years (I am more modest than Ignatius) and I can guarantee to make a heretic out of him. This is one reason I have such a soft spot in my heart for theological seminaries. For what better place for the spawning of heretics than a place where orthodoxy is merely *taken for granted*?

I have found that the best way to meet the challenge of a seminary is to make sure that there are a few people around asking questions, or making comments, which appear to be innocent but are really loaded. Nothing, somehow, is more disturbing to the young seminarian than the inference that he is not really in the main stream or that he is missing out on the newest thing theologically. So, by planting my agents (chiefly first year men fresh from college) in all the seminaries each fall, I insure an annual bumper crop of heretics among the graduating seniors, and thus keep my message alive and vigorous in the church at large. These are the kinds of comments I direct them to make:

To the man who knows all about Kierkegaard: "I don't see how it's possible to make a real appraisal of Kierkegaard until somebody finishes translating the *Papieren*." (Since probably nobody ever will, this should be a useful deflating instrument for many generations.)

To the man who knows all about Barth: "I don't read German very well . . . but I've gotten the impression that Barth has changed his mind on that matter." (Notice that my lads don't even have to lie to thrust this one into the dormitory discussion. For there is no necessary connection at all between the two sides of the ellipsis. If pressed, my boys are instructed simply to ask for elucidation, and not to try to "prove" a thing. The more innocently they do this the more unsettling the result will be.)

To the man who has his New Testament theology all worked out: "Have you ever considered what Bultmann's theories do to that position?"

(Chances are he has, and isn't a bit happy about the outcome.) If things are going a little too neatly for the New Testament expert, I have occasionally instructed my men to edge toward heresy themselves, by some such statement as, "Well, of course, that's predicated on the highly debatable assumption that Paul himself wrote Ephesians." If there are signs of consternation, a retreat can be effected by the surprised comment, "Why, I thought that surely that was still an open question around here."

To the man who has a sophisticated theology: "How do you mean that dialectically or paradoxically? It's frightfully important to know which."

To the man who has some really first-rate ideas about culture, communication, etc.: "Well, what you're saying may very well be true, in a general sort of way, *but is it biblical?*" (Here heresy is multiplied by adopting the pose of orthodoxy. The brilliant student will start to reply, "Why, whatever has *that* got to do with it." But he will stop and think better of it, because he will not want to create the impression that he doesn't take the Bible seriously. A doubt will have been sown, like unto a grain of mustard seed.)

Finally, if there is no other way to deflate the promising young men in the senior class, a somewhat sneaky device is available to be used only *in extremis*. I tell my men to observe when a certain senior has slept until after chapel some morning. Then at lunch time one of them is to approach him and say, his voice trembling with innocence and sincerity, "I simply couldn't make head or tail out of that sermon in chapel this morning. *What did you think of it?*" If the senior tries to bluff it through, he will be trapped in intellectual iniquity. If he admits he wasn't there, he will be trapped into an admission of spiritual iniquity. Either way he will be trapped . . . in iniquity.

I have renewed hopes each fall as the seminaries get under way.

In Our Next Issue

EUGENE J. McCARTHY writes on the Christian's call to politics as a vocation. "The Christian, in approaching politics, must remember that politics is part of a real world.

Man's need for the state rests in his rational, social nature. This need would remain even though man had never fallen. . . . A society of saints, if they drove automobiles, would (still) present the problem of whether they should pass on the right or on the left side of the road."

Is There A New Russia Since Stalin?

(Continued from Page 150)

Russia and the Russians are changing, and some of the recent changes point in the direction of more humane life than in the impossible days of Stalin. One fears that the changes are too late, too slight, too dilatory, too uncertain of continuity to be of benefit in relation to the bellowing might of the political operators. Except for Stalin's dealings with Tito, Khrushchev has not questioned one of his master's foreign policies or their conquests. As Isaiah Berlin, a most understanding scholar of Marxism, has recently written: "Soviet society is organized not for happiness, comfort, liberty, justice, personal relationships, but for combat." Lester Pearson returned from Moscow to say to his fellow-Canadians: "My abiding impression was one of great power on the part of the state, of massive power, massive strength, indeed of great collective wealth and of inflexible purpose." *Pravda* spoke conclusively after Khrushchev's speech on Stalin had been widely discussed in Communist circles:

No Need To Make Your Own . . .

"Make-it-yourself" Christmas gifts are becoming more popular each year. But if you aren't a handy man with a hammer or a craftsman with needle and thread . . . let us make your Christmas gifts for you. We publish CHRISTIANITY AND CRISIS 24 times a year, and what more could your friends ask for than a new reminder of your thoughtfulness every two weeks? This year, your friends will receive an additional gift along with their year's subscription: a copy of *What the Christian Hopes for in Society*, an Association Press paperback containing articles reprinted from CHRISTIANITY AND CRISIS by such writers as Reinhold Niebuhr, Paul Tillich and John Bennett.

For this double gift, make out your shopping list on the enclosed order slip and send it to us today! Special Christmas Gift Rate: \$3.00.

Detroit Public Library
Book Receiving Dept.
5201 Woodward Ave.
Detroit 2, Mich.

27462 11-57

"As for our country, the Communist Party has been and will be the only master of the minds and thoughts, the spokesman, leader and organizer of the people."

WORLD CHURCH: NEWS AND NOTES

From Florida

When the Southern Presbyterian Men's Convention met in Miami in mid-October, all attention was focused expectantly on evangelist Billy Graham, who was to address the opening session. But when the speeches were over, the laurels were carried off by Governor Leroy S. Collins of Florida. Originally scheduled to give a few "words of welcome," Gov. Collins met the Presbyterians on their home grounds. Using the biblical story of Pilate's hand-washing, he charged that this was the attitude of too many churchmen toward racial integration controversies. In an editorial praising Gov. Collins' address the *Presbyterian Outlook* commented: "In this day of weak compromises and compromisers, Gov. Collins is raising a banner of Christian courage . . . at a great personal risk for a man in public life . . . for whom larger political possibilities have been pointed out." Nevertheless, the editorial noted, the Presbyterians had to observe racial segregation in its Miami housing arrangements.

From Church World Service

An appeal for \$1 million to finance the 1958 Share Our Surplus program will be launched during the Thanksgiving season by Church World Service. American Protestants will be asked to provide the necessary funds to ship 300 million pounds of food overseas to needy persons.

CHRISTIANITY and CRISIS

A Christian Journal of Opinion
537 WEST 121 ST. • NEW YORK 27 • N. Y.

EDITORIAL BOARD

REINHOLD NIEBUHR AND JOHN C. BENNETT, *Chairmen*

WAYNE H. COWAN, *Managing Editor*

ODESSA SOUTHERN ELLIOTT, *Assistant Editor*

M. SEARLE BATES WALDO BEACH AMOS WILDER

ROBERT MCAFEE BROWN F. ERNEST JOHNSON

JOSEPH SITTLER HENRY P. VAN DUSEN

CONTRIBUTING EDITORS

FRANCIS P. MILLER J. OSCAR LEE

JOHN BAILEY WILLIAM F. MAY ROGER L. SHINN

KENNETH W. THOMPSON WILLIAM LEE MILLER

HENRY SMITH LEIPER JOHN A. MACKAY

HERBERT BUTTERFIELD

CONTENTS

IS THERE A NEW RUSSIA SINCE STALIN?

ST. HERETICUS

M. SEARLE BATES